Kurdish Landmine Plight Across and Along the Borders
This article discusses the intricate global and internal conflicts that plague the Kurdish
region with emphasis on the profound impact these conflicts have on mine action in
this area of the Middle East.
by Armin Köhli [ Geneva Call ]

T

he Kurdish region lies in one of the centres of ongoing global
conflicts and has its own, home-grown disputes. Rich oil fields
and water sources are abundant, and the living areas of Kurds,
Arabs, Turks, Turkmen, Persians, Azeris and others overlap. All the
countries where the Kurds live (Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey) are heavily
mined, mainly along state borders, with mines generally imported from
Western countries.
Despite the strong national ambitions of various Kurdish organisations since the 1940s, a Kurdish national state does not yet exist. In each
of the four states with a Kurdish minority, Kurds clamour for national,
cultural and democratic rights. Depending on both the legal and political situation, these outcries differ in kinds and methods from state to
state. Some Kurds form human rights groups and committees; others
promote Kurdish culture through cultural associations or join ethnically based political parties. Frequently, political campaigning occurs
alongside armed struggle. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has been
fighting the Turkish Army for more than 20 years. The situation differs in northern Iraq, where a coalition of Kurdish parties—the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party—have formed
a regional government with their Peshmerga1 controlling the territory
since the Persian Gulf War in 1991.
The Kurdish question tends to be “exported” because there isn’t a
common or coherent agenda among Kurdish organisations and the
states in which they reside. Civilians have left, either freely or by force,
areas of Kurdish resistance, and Kurdish guerrillas and political parties
have been driven to neighbouring countries. In recent years, and especially since the start of the Iraq War in 2003, northern Iraq has become
the stronghold for the PKK of Turkey and for various Kurdish groups
of Iran.
Conflicts both with “global players” and internally are still “hot”—or
at least latent—and far from being resolved. Ongoing conflicts, varying
state legislation, and the differing interests and agendas of the involved
states and non-state actors define the condition of mine action for the
Kurdish region. Of the states with Kurdish populations, only Turkey and
Iraq have signed the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention, 2 and since
parts of the territories are controlled by armed NSAs, NSA engagement
is essential for the mine ban and general clearance. The highly developed satellite media of various Kurdish NSAs can play an important
role in mine-risk education in affected rural regions; therefore, Geneva
Call has been working since its establishment in 2000 to engage Kurdish
NSAs in dialogue.
Syria: A Lack of Mine Action
Eight to 10 percent (around 1.5 million people) of the Syrian population is Kurdish. A major reason for tension between the Arab majority
and the Kurds stems from a resettlement project in the late 1950s—an
“Arab belt” was created against a contiguous Kurdish region across the
Syrian-Turkish border. Additionally, an estimated 120,000 Kurds lost
their citizenship as part of the 1962 census, a number that has grown to
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more than 300,000 Kurds today. The Syrian state recognises the problem
and President Bashar al-Asad has announced willingness to renationalise the stateless Syrian Kurds.
Citizenship is crucial to Kurdish demands, which have been underlined by occasional demonstrations. Kurdish political parties, like all
ethnically based parties, are illegal in Syria, but some are tolerated. For a
decade, Syria was an important location for the Kurdish leaders from its
neighbouring states. In 1988, Jalal Talabani, Iraq’s current president and
then leader of the PUK, fled to Syria. In the 1990s, the PKK of Turkey had
its political headquarters in Damascus until Syria, under heavy Turkish
pressure, forced the PKK leader Abdullah Öcallan to leave in 1998.
As Syria is not a State Party to the Ottawa Convention, there is no
official report about mine use there. According to the Electronic Mine
Information Network and confirmed by a Syrian nongovernmental
organisation, mines have allegedly been placed along the Syrian border
with Turkey, which is mainly a Kurdish region. Some cases of mineand unexploded ordnance-amputations come from the Syrian-Turkish
border. Mine action in Syria is focussed on the town of Quneitra and its
surroundings in the Golan Heights. There is no mine-risk education or
specific survivor assistance in the Syrian Kurdish areas, and there is no
demining there, either.
Iran: Ethnic Clashes
Around eight million Kurds live in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
mainly in four northwestern provinces, but also in major cities outside the
Kurdish region. Kurdish ambitions and demands, raised by various NSAs,
are intertwined with a more general opposition to the Islamic Republic,
especially as the Kurdish society tends to be more secular than the current
Islamic state. In 2005 and 2006, at least 17 people were killed during protests and clashes in Kurdish towns, according to Human Rights Watch.3
The Kurdish region is severely affected by landmines and UXO.
During the Iran-Iraq War,4 some 12–16 million landmines were emplaced
in Iran, covering more than four million hectares (15,444 square miles). 5
The contaminated area was reduced to 24,000 square kilometres (9,266
square miles) following clearance of 18,000 square kilometres (6,950
square miles) between 1988 and 2003.6 A mine problem also results
from an internal Iranian conflict. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution,
an offensive began in the north of the country against Kurdish rebels. At
that time, the Iranian Army allegedly planted an unknown number of
mines around their barracks and compounds to prevent Kurdish rebels
from attacking.
Provinces with Kurdish populations—Kurdistan, Western Azer
baijan, Ilam and Kermanshah—all lay on the heavily mined border with
Iraq but are less affected than Khuzestan in the south. Between 1988
and 2002, there were 6,765 landmine casualties in Iran.7,2 Casualties
were recorded in Kurdistan, with 437 killed and 1,720 injured; Western
Azerbaijan, with 198 killed and 192 injured; Ilam, with 730 killed
and 250 injured; Kermanshah, with 874 killed and 522 injured; and
Khuzestan, with 601 killed and 1,241 injured.
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The Landmine Monitor reports increasing mine action in recent years. For instance,
the Republic of Iran Mine Action Center
developed a 10-year plan to eliminate all
landmines in Iran by 2015. According to
the plan, Kurdistan province would have
been completely cleared by March 2006 and
Western Azerbaijan province would have
been demined by March 2007; however, the
LM has not received any information about
the progress made so far. MRE is focussed on
Kurdistan province. An MRE video was produced in Kurdish with Persian subtitles. From
2002 to April 2005, 115 of 891 urban schools
and 523 of 2,236 rural schools received MRE. 8
This program was reviewed during 2005; it was
found that 70 percent of the students retained
knowledge of landmines and that there was
an 80-percent reduction in mine-related incidents in Kurdistan compared to 2004. During
2005, the program focussed on shepherds and
schoolchildren. However, there seems to be
almost no MRE in the Kurdish regions except
in Kurdistan province.
Of the armed Kurdish NSAs, the Demo
cratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI)
and Komalah Party-Iranian Kurdistan have
suspended their armed struggle for the time
being. PDKI unilaterally declared its renunciation of the use of anti-personnel mines and
signed Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment for
Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel
Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action7
on 4 December 2007. Komalah, approached
by Geneva Call, also shares this position (at
least verbally). Both parties are members
of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples

Organization, which adopted a resolution of
committing to a total mine ban and calling
on all NSAs to sign Geneva Call’s Deed of
Commitment in October 2006.
One NSA still fighting is based in the Iraqi
Qandeel Mountains; the Party for Freedom
and Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) launches dozens of guerrilla attacks in Iran. The Iranian
Army reacts with frequent artillery shelling
of the Qandeel Mountains. The PJAK is widely
considered a wing of the PKK of Turkey. In
contrast to the PKK, however, it has made no
statement on the use of APMs or mine action.
Turkey: No-go Areas and Commitments
More than 15 million Kurds live in Turkey.
The armed struggle of the PKK—today called
Kurdistan People’s Congress Kongra-Gel with
its military wing People’s Defence Forces
HPG—began in 1984. The first period of
this long armed conflict ended in 1999 when
PKK leader Abdullah Öcallan was arrested.
Approximately 30,000 people died in this war.
Millions in the Kurdish northeast of the country were displaced and fled to the urban centres and cities in the rest of the country. Some
3,000 Kurdish villages were evacuated. The
Turkish security forces burned many villages.
After evacuation, “mines were laid around
villages, military installations, border areas,
water springs, feeding grounds, pathways and
mountain caves.”8 The PKK itself admitted to
sporadically using AP mines until 1999.
After Öcallan’s arrest, many of the 10,000
PKK fighters fled to Iraqi Kurdistan. Since
June 2004, when the PKK ended a unilateral
ceasefire declared in 1999, it has been wag-

ing a guerrilla war from its headquarters in
the northern Iraqi Qandeel Mountains. The
Turkish state reacts with heavy troop concentrations at its border with Iraq and occasional
cross-border operations.
In May 2006, Turkey reported under
Article 79 of the Ottawa Convention a total
of 984,313 emplaced mines, of which 164,497
were anti-vehicle mines on the Syrian border and 819,816 were anti-personnel mines
in an unspecified number of areas.10 Turkey
acceded to the Ottawa Convention in 2003. 8
The PKK stated in 2005 that it had banned AP
mines, and in 2006, its representatives signed
Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment. There is
no confirmed use of AP mines by either side
since they declared the ban. However, the PKK
admits the use of command-detonated mines.
According to the LM, in 2005, the
Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey identified
at least 220 new mine/UXO casualties in 62
incidents, including 68 people killed and 152
injured.6 This figure represents a significant
increase, compared to the 168 mine/UXO
casualties reported in 2004 and 67 in 2003.
These numbers may not accurately reflect the
incidence of mine/UXO casualties, however.
Turkey reported 194 military mine casualties—39 killed and 155 injured—for 2005.10
This number, quoted in the LM 2006, might
include military casualties from commanddetonated mines amongst AP mine casualties.
Additionally, it seems that many of the military casualties reported are not mine/UXO
but conflict casualties.
Turkish media and security forces regularly
accuse the PKK of causing the incidents
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Landmines/Explosive Remnants of War and the War
on Terrorism in the MENA
This article looks at the relationship between the existing landmine and explosive remnants of war1 problem in
the Middle East and North Africa, and terrorist activities in the area by explaining the scope of the mine/ERW
Collected UXO in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2007.

by planting new mines, which the PKK
denies. Field research done in the Kurdish
Dicle district, which was conducted by the
Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey on behalf
of the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines to
examine incidents in 2007, suggests a different
picture. Local communities reported that the
incidents were caused by “old” mines laid by
the security forces. The victims are mostly
poor Kurdish villagers who were evacuated
in 1991–1992 and have now returned to their
villages. According to them, many minefields
are insufficiently marked or completely
unmarked. The returning villagers are in
danger when going to their fields, vineyards,
gardens and water resources. Additionally,
MRE is almost non-existent in the affected
regions, except for some warning signs by the
Turkish Army in some areas.
The Turkish government plans to issue a
tender for commercial companies to demine
areas along the Syrian border.10 Clearance of
all mined areas on the Syrian border would
cost around US$600 million and would be
undertaken by companies that would use the
land for agriculture in order to create new
employment opportunities in the region.
Should this plan work out, it would confiscate
a 510-kilometre-long (317-mile-long) stretch
of mostly fertile land and grant it to big companies, potentially hindering the small farmers from going back to their villages, unless
they become low-paid wage workers.
Iraq: Unifying Mine Action
Some 5.5 million people live in the
Kurdistan region in northern Iraq, of which
four million are Kurds. The Landmine
Monitor puts it clearly: “The Kurdish governorates, some of the most contaminated areas
of the world with 1,428 affected communities,
contend with thousands of tactical minefields
on the borders with Iran and Turkey and further contamination along the Green Line,
the former frontline between Kurdish forces
and Saddam Hussein’s Army, as well as UXO
across all three governorates.”11 Four thousand out of 5,000 villages were destroyed during the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1988,
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and many of them were mined after the evacuation. Between 1991 and 2000 alone, 10,997
mine/UXO casualties were reported in six
governorates of northern Iraq; 3,697 people
were killed and 7,300 injured.
The first Kurdish rebellion in modern
Iraq started in 1961 under the leadership of
Mustafa Barzani, the father of today’s Regional
President Masud Barzani. In 1970, the autonomous Kurdistan region was established for
the first time in an agreement with the central
government in Baghdad. But from then until
1991, its status was disputed and subject to
violent conflicts. The most infamous event in
this series of conflicts was the “Anfal” campaign by Saddam Hussein’s forces with the use
of chemical weapons and a poison-gas attack
against the Kurdish town of Halabja.
Following an insurgency, in the aftermath
of the first Iraq conflict, and with military
support by the United States and its allies, the
Kurdish parties Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
and Kurdistan Democratic Party took control
of the region in October 1991. After the start
of the Iraq War in 2003, the Kurdistan region
became a semi-autonomous, federally recognised, political entity. However, the Kurdistan
region remains part of the Federal Republic
of Iraq, and PUK leader Jalal Talabani is
the President of Iraq. Both the PUK and the
KDP, forming a coalition now in the region,
are committed to mine action. Even before
the invasion of Iraq by the United States and
its allies in 2003, as de facto authorities in
northern Iraq, they signed and implemented
Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment in 2002.
The two existing mine-action centres in Arbil
and Suleymaniyah are conducting demining
and MRE programmes on a large scale. Mines
Advisory Group, since 1992, and Norwegian
People’s Aid, since 1997, have been conducting such programmes, too. On a small scale,
the PPK is also demining for humanitarian
purposes and carries out ad hoc MRE in the
Qandeel Mountains.
The Kurdish Parliament passed a law unifying the two existing mine-action centres
into the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency,
something it had done even before Iraq recently

joined the Ottawa Convention. A unified
mine-action agency for the whole region is a
big step toward further strengthening of mine
action and toward a mine-free Kurdistan.
Conclusion
While the situation varies in each of the
four states with Kurdish populations—Syria,
Iran, Turkey and Iraq—Kurds are demanding rights on every level in the midst of local
and global conflicts. These conflicts create the
need for organised mine action and Kurdish
regional legislation to protect the local populations from UXO and landmines.
See Endnotes, page 110
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problem in the region; the huge availability of explosives for use in illegal activities, particularly terrorism; and
the case of Algeria and Egypt being affected by recent terrorist acts.
by Ayman Sorour
[ Protection Against Armaments & Consequences ]

T

he Middle East and North Africa region is affected by mines/
ERW because of the many wars and conflicts this region witnessed since the 1940s through today. Historically and geographically, the mine/ERW problem began in MENA around the end of
World War II in North Africa, and continued through the invasion of
Iraq by Coalition Forces in 2003. In addition, a number of internal conflicts and wars have resulted in contamination. These internal conflicts
have taken place in: Oman (1964–1975), Lebanon (1975–1990), Yemen
(1994) and Algeria (1991–present). Securing borders and strategic locations are other reasons for existing mines in Algeria, Egypt, Israel
Jordan, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and maybe other countries.
Tons of Explosives Available for Use
There are 15 affected countries and territories in MENA contaminated with millions of mines and ERW. Some of those countries have
declared the numbers of mines and ERW in their lands, though others
have not as they do not know how many remain. All affected countries,
however, have projections based on estimated affected land and previous
demining operations.
Regional projections vary greatly, totaling 52–66 million mines and
ERW. The estimated contaminations of each country are as follows:
• Algeria: 2,783,555
• Egypt: 21,600,000 (only 20–25 percent are mines)
• Iran: 12–16 million
• Iraq: 8–12 million before the 2003 Coalition invasion, which
surely increased those numbers
• Israel: 260,000, emplanted by Israel for security reasons
• Jordan: 203,000
• Kuwait: small number after clearance of 5–7 million
• Lebanon: 406,000 mines and 4 million ERW, the majority of
which are cluster submunitions left after the last Israeli conflict
with Hezbollah/Lebanon in July and August 2006
• Libya: 1.5–3 million
• Syria: 500,000
• Tunisia: 3,240 mines and an unknown number of ERW
• Yemen: 150,000 to 2 million
In Oman, Palestine and Western Sahara, the numbers of mines and
ERW are unknown.
Given the fact that the aforementioned mines and ERW differ in type
and composition, the amount of live explosives they contain differs, too.
On average, the live explosives can be estimated at 0.25 grams (0.88

ounces) per item, 2 which means the quantity of available live explosives
in MENA is between 13,151 and 16,489 metric tons (16,229 U.S. tons).
These explosives are not secured and cannot be secured due to the fact
that the large part of lands where they are found is not easily accessible
for political reasons, as in Iraq, or because no survey has been completed, as in Algeria, Egypt and Libya.
The first question that may come to mind is: How easy is it to clear
such mines and ERW, considering the very low level of practical experience of those who do it? The answer is that it is undoubtedly risky and
dangerous work, but in some affected countries, mines and ERW can
be found on the land’s surface, like the way the Iraqi Army planted
landmines in Kuwait. Previous munitions stores and abandoned arms
caches, such as the many the Iraqi Army left behind after the initial
Coalition Forces invasion in 2003, are also obvious locations. In other
places, locals may have little experience to help them clear mines and
ERW. For instance, Polisario said mines it has are those it cleared from
the Moroccan defensive walls built to divide Western Sahara between
them and Morocco. Consequently, the possibility of mine and ERW
clearance by a person with a very low level of experience is a reality.
Explosives for Free and Illegal Activities
It is not known when explosives from mines and ERW were first
used in illegal activities, but it is not a recent occurrence. Explosives
from mines and ERW have historically been used in fishing and mining operations, providing a cheap and easy method for both activities.
Some Bedouins in remote areas use these explosives to secure their private properties from thieves or to secure their drug plants from others,
including police forces.
Since 2003, explosives from mines and ERW have been used in terrorist acts in MENA. In Iraq, a 2003 attack against the United Nations
headquarters in Baghdad resulted in the death of the U.N. envoy to Iraq
and the death and injury of more than a dozen others. This terrorist
attack was one of the biggest uses of that type of explosive; this use of
explosives continues in Iraq. Similar terrorist acts occurred in Sinai,
Egypt, in October 2004, July 2005 and in April 2006. The government
admitted that explosives in those terrorist acts were taken from mines
and ERW. Although the Algerian government did not announce the origin of explosives used by the two car bombers in April 2007 who attacked
the government building and police station in Algiers, and a suicide car
bomber in Lakhdaria (80 kilometers [50 miles] from Algiers), explosives
may have come from mines/ERW. Recently in Yemen, the government
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